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10.1 Introduction
After several years of closing up their economies from international trade
as a means of fostering internal industrial development, several Latin Amer-
ican nations realized that their industrial sectors, which had prospered under
protection, were not capable of surviving international competition. Once it
became clear that it was too costly or even impossible for a country to con-
tinue pursuing protectionist policies, it also appeared that the sacriﬁces they
had undertaken to acquire industrial development had been in vain.
The backwardness of Latin American industry has generally been
blamed on protectionist policies, which, for their part, have been generally
considered the result of ideology. In particular, this backwardness is said to
be a result of the development of the dependentist and structuralist schools
of economic thought sponsored by the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) from the 1940s to the 1970s. This explanation has often
been complemented by the development of economic models describing
how a government can be captured by interest groups to generate such
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Aurora Gómez-Galvarriatopolicies. However, very few historical studies have been undertaken to ﬁnd
out how protectionist policies and industrial backwardness came about.
From Coatsworth and Williamson (2002) we know that Latin American
tariﬀs were far higher than anywhere else in the century before the Great
Depression. Yet they experienced a huge surge during this period, as they
did in the rest of the world. However, while most countries decreased tariﬀs
earlier on, Latin America persisted in its protectionism for several decades
after World War II. What were the forces driving this process?
This paper addresses this question from a microperspective, by study-
ing the evolution of international competitiveness and protection levels in
Mexican textile manufactures, which is a paradigmatic example of an over-
protected industry unable to compete internationally. By 1990 most mills
in the traditional Mexican textile regions of Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Veracruz
were on the verge of bankruptcy, if they had not already closed. A visit to
several of them evidenced the use of outdated technology, which in some
cases dated back to the nineteenth century.
What happened to the Mexican textile industry? What were the causes
of its demise? Was it always as noncompetitive internationally as it ap-
peared by the mid-1980s? If not, how did it evolve to become so? Why?
Because data on the textile industry at the national level are not rich and
accurate enough to provide answers to many of these questions, I am go-
ing to study the case of a particular ﬁrm, the Compañía Industrial Ver-
acruzana S.A. (CIVSA). This ﬁrm owned one of the biggest and most
modern mills operating in Mexico during Porﬁrian times (1880–1910). Al-
though operating until the present time with great struggle, it is but a
shadow of what it used to be. Through this study CIVSA’s archival mate-
rial will be complemented with information available on a national basis,
in order to set it in a more general context.
The plan of the paper is the following: First, a brief overview of the
textile industry of the period is provided to give an idea of how repre-
sentative CIVSA was. Then, CIVSA’s prices, costs, and productivity lev-
els will be contrasted with those of the United States and Great Britain,
to make an assessment of CIVSA’s international stature. Information to
carry out this comparison was available for 1911, providing an accurate
picture of CIVSA’s situation at the end of the Porﬁriato. An analysis of
the reasons behind CIVSA’s relative production cost level is carried out
to get a full picture of CIVSA’s competitive situation from an interna-
tional perspective around 1911. Then, the evolution of CIVSA’s labor
productivity from 1900 to 1930 will be explored. This will give an idea of
how the institutional changes that came about with the Revolution
aﬀected this variable. A study of the evolution of tariﬀ protection for the
textile industry will be undertaken in order to understand how levels of
protection changed and interacted with productivity and the level of
competitiveness.
364 Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato10.2 CIVSA and the Mexican Textile Industry: A General Background
The Compañía Industrial Veracruzana S. A. was founded in 1896. Its tex-
tile mill, Santa Rosa, started working in 1898 (by that time there were
around 120 cotton textile mills operating in Mexico). The ﬁrst textile mills
were established in Mexico in the 1830s and slowly developed through the
nineteenth century, having to face Mexico’s diﬃcult political and economic
conditions. Between 1890 and 1910 the textile industry experienced an era
of rapid modernization and expansion as a result of political stability,
greater economic growth, and the modernization in communications and
transportation that the arrival of railroads and the telegraph in the previous
decade had brought about. During this period, several textile corporations
like CIVSA were founded. They built new mills and modernized old ones,
enlarged the scale of production, introduced hydroelectric power to run the
mills, and introduced state-of-the-art technologies of production.
This process also meant a concentration of the industry, since due to a
slow development of the ﬁnancial sector only a few companies could un-
dertake the investment required to carry out such transformation.1 Eight
textile conglomerates founded by the turn of the century owned only 12
percent of the mills but 41 percent of the spindles, 45 percent of the looms,
and 60 percent of the printing machines of the entire industry. These com-
panies employed 38 percent of the labor force in the industry and paid 40
percent of the taxes. CIDOSA (13.5 percent) and CIVSA (6.3 percent)
alone accounted for 20 percent of the total sales in the industry and em-
ployed 18 percent of the labor force. In 1912, CIVSA’s Santa Rosa mill was
the second largest mill operating in Mexico (after only the Compañía In-
dustrial de Orizaba S.A., Río Blanco mill), working with 40,184 spindles,
1,685 looms, and 1,560 workers, compared to a national average of 6,299
spindles, 229 looms and 254 workers per mill. The average mill in the
United States in 1910 operated with 20,714 spindles, 502 looms and 286
workers. By 1912 only 23 percent of the textile mills were corporations (so-
ciedades anónimas) and only six of them traded stock in the stock market.
CIVSA was one of them. As this makes clear, CIVSA was representative
only of the fraction of the textile sector that had modernized their mills
during the period (roughly 12 percent of the mills, but which made 40 per-
cent of the cotton textile production). The Santa Rosa mill is still operat-
ing today, but it has recently been declared bankrupt.
10.3 CIVSA’s International Competitiveness
How competitive were CIVSA’s selling prices, compared with English
and American prices for similar products? Because yarn was produced us-
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1. See Stephen Haber (1997).ing standard measures throughout the world, it is usually easier to com-
pare its costs and prices than those for cloth, produced in a myriad of
diﬀerent brands and of varying qualities. Yet because CIVSA did not sell
yarn, no information on yarn costs and sale prices exists in its archives.
Thus, it was necessary to ﬁnd information on types of cloth made in for-
eign countries similar to those produced by CIVSA. Table 10.1shows a list
of American and English fabrics, which by weight and type were similar to
those CIVSA manufactured. Because CIVSA’s cloth was generally nar-
rower than American and English cloth, all prices were transformed into
pesos per square meter. Data on production costs provided by CIVSA’s
records did not include general expenses, depreciation, and a return on
capital. Thus these items were estimated and added to the original cost ﬁg-
ures, assuming returns on capital of 5 percent, 8 percent, or 10 percent (see
table 10.1).
As table 10.2 shows, CIVSA’s prices were 64 percent higher than Amer-
ican prices and 28 percent higher than English prices on average. However,
once the tariﬀ is added to foreign prices, CIVSA’s prices were only 1 per-
cent higher than American prices and 14 percent below British prices, on
average. If transportation costs for foreign cloth were added, CIVSA’s rel-
ative prices would have been even lower. Foreign competition, tariﬀs in-
cluded, seems to have been an important benchmark for deﬁning CIVSA’s
prices, which were basically the same as those of its domestic competitors
(e.g., CIDOSA). This was true because there was not much domestic com-
petition in the Mexican market for higher-quality cloth.
Table 10.2 also shows that CIVSA required much lower tariﬀs than those
established to compete with American competitors and practically none to
compete with the British for most of the types of cloth in the sample. As-
suming a return on capital of 8 percent, in 1911 several of the types of cloth
shown in table 10.1 could have competed with English imports, but practi-
cally none with American imports. However, much lower tariﬀs than those
established would have suﬃced to enable CIVSA to compete with foreign
imports (on average only 41 percent of the tariﬀ was necessary for CIVSA
to compete with American cloth and no tariﬀ to compete with English
weaves). Because Mexico imported fabrics mostly from England, cloth
prices from this country were more relevant for the Mexican industry (see
table 10.3).2 Thusa great part of the tariﬀ served merely to provide CIVSA
with higher proﬁt margins. It would be revealing to make a similar com-
parison for some year in the 1920s, but the relevant information is not
available.
Although the Mexican cotton textile industry enjoyed high protection
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2. It is diﬃcult to understand why Mexican textile imports came mostly from England,
given that American goods of similar qualities had lower prices. I believe this situation re-
sulted from the commercial networks England had already established in these type of prod-
ucts, which must have taken some time for Americans business to build.T
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.levels during the Porﬁriato (see tables 10.4 and 10.5), they were not higher
than those of the United States. A comparison of Mexican and American
tariﬀ levels indicates that levels of protection for cloth in Mexico were ac-
tually lower than in the United States in 1911. In that year the American
ad valorem equivalent duty for coarse unbleached cloth, similar to those
table 10.4 describes (paragraphs 315–17 of the U.S. tariﬀ schedule), rose
from 20.68 percent to 52.22 percent, depending on the particular kind of
cloth. The simple average of all duties for unbleached cloth in paragraphs
315–17 was 34.9 percent. American tariﬀs for ﬁne unbleached cloth com-
parable to that described in table 10.5 (paragraphs 318–19 of the U.S. tariﬀ
schedule) ranged from 36.45 percent to 48.05 percent; its simple average
was 41.8.3In Mexico the comparable ad valorem equivalent tariﬀs for 1911
were 20.1 percent and 26 percent, respectively. American tariﬀs for
1911 were even higher than the average Mexican duties for 1900–1910 of
33.3 percent and 40.5 percent, respectively. Because raw cotton was tariﬀ-
free in the United States, eﬀective protection rates4were even higher in that
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Table 10.3 Cloth imported by Mexico from the United States and the United
Kingdom as a percentage of total cloth imports
U.S. (% imports) England (% imports)
Year Quantity Value Quantity Value
1903 11.00 11.87 77.28 71.63
1904 17.51 18.28 70.85 66.25
1905 16.93 16.62 66.82 61.70
1906 13.20 14.91 70.79 64.73
1907 10.91 13.66 70.64 63.53
1908 8.03 8.52 72.30 67.83
Sources: México, SHCP, Boletín de Estadística Fiscal, various years.
Notes: Tariﬀ schedule paragraphs considered were 458–61 from 1903 to 1905 and 333–36
from 1906–08.
3. The American tariﬀ schedule was far more speciﬁc than the Mexican one, providing for
several duties, depending on square yards per pound, threads per square inch, and value per
square yard, whereas the Mexican tariﬀ schedule provided for a single duty (House of Repre-
sentatives, Cotton Manufactures,I, 69). The Mexican duty only divided unbleached and white
cloth between that with fewer than 30 threads per 5 square millimeters and that with more
than 30 threads in that area; that is, with fewer or more than 152.28 threads per square inch.
4. The eﬀective rate of protection (EPR) is the percentage excess of the domestic price of
the value-added unit over its world market price. The eﬀective rates of protection are calcu-
lated using the following formula: ERP  (W i– V i )/V i, where Wiis the percentage excess of do-
mestic value added and V i is the world market value added. The numerator can be calculated
either as a diﬀerence between domestic and world market value added, or as the diﬀerence be-
tween the tariﬀ on the product and the tariﬀ on the material input weighted by the latter’s
share in the product price on the world market. Thus it is calculated as: ERP   (T t – ActT c)/
(V t ), where T t is the nominal tariﬀ for cloth, T c is the nominal tariﬀ for cotton, Aft is the coeﬃ-
cient of cotton as a share of the value of cloth under free trade, and V tis the world market value
added for the textile industry. See Bela Balassa and Associates (1971, 5–6, 315–18). I am grate-
ful to Graciela Márquez for her explanations of this subject.T
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.country with respect to Mexico than the diﬀerence suggested by their ad
valorem tariﬀs.
10.4 Explaining CIVSA’s Higher Costs during the Porﬁriato
Part of the diﬀerence in prices between Mexico and the United States re-
sulted from the cost of raw cotton, which on average was 20 percent more
expensive at CIVSA than in the United States during the Porﬁriato.
CIVSA purchased its raw cotton from either New Orleans or the Laguna
region in Mexico, depending on its price and availability. Generally, Mex-
ican cotton reached CIVSA at almost the same price as the New Orleans
cotton, with a variation of only a few cents.5
Since cotton represented between 57 percent (shirting) and 79 percent
(brown drills) of the cost of cloth in the United States, if the U.S. industry
had paid the extra 20 percent cotton cost in Mexico it would have faced an
additional cost of between 11 and 15 percent in these fabrics. Considering
machinery costs were approximately 20 percent more in Mexico due to
transportation costs, we can assume that erecting a mill in Mexico would
cost 20 percent more than in the United States.6 If this was true, and be-
cause depreciation and return on capital (of 8 percent) were 12 percent of
the cost of cloth per yard in the United States,7 the extra cost of the mill
would represent an additional 2.4 percent over the American cost of cloth
production. Together, the extra cost of cotton and of mill establishment
would have accounted, at the most, for an extra cost of 17.4 percent. Yet
CIVSA’s costs of producing these fabrics (assuming an 8 percent return on
capital) were on average 28 percent above U.S. prices for such fabrics. An
important part of the diﬀerence was the result of labor productivity, partly
determined by technology.
In the category of spinning, the low wages in Mexico relative to those in
the United States and the United Kingdom allowed CIVSA to enjoy lower
costs of labor per pound of yarn spun than in American or English mills.8
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5. This is an upper-bound estimate, because the average value of the cotton used in the
American mill reported by the TariﬀBoard in 1911 was 15.568 cents per pound, instead of 13
cents as indicated by the historical statistics of the United States and used in table 10.4. Be-
cause the price of cotton at CIVSA in 1911 was 16.203 cents per pound, the Tariﬀ Board ﬁg-
ure would make the price diﬀerence only 4.1 percent instead of 25 percent (as table 10.4 indi-
cates). See House of Representatives (1912, 410). Prices compared were spot prices of
“Upland Middling” at New York, from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, 208). Prices for
CIVSA come from company documents, including inventories, purchase invoices, and the
cost of cotton reported in its books for Movimientos Generales. CIVSA bought American
Strict Middling and Good Middling cotton, Mexican cotton of similar qualities to the Amer-
ican cotton it purchased, and Egyptian cotton.
6. This corresponds to the average cost of importing machinery from England to Mexico in
the 1900s. See Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato, The Impact of Revolution, 156.
7. Ibid., 467.
8. This disagrees with Gregory Clark’s conclusions that once the eﬃciency of the local la-
bor is taken into account, “real labor costs turn out to be as high as those in Britain in mostYet CIVSA produced a considerably lower quantity of yarn per spindle
than its American counterpart (see table 10.6). Although CIVSA used ring
spindles instead of mule spindles, its pounds per spindle were similar to
those produced by the mule-spinning English mill.9 CIVSA was obviously
not taking advantage of using ring spindles. However, while the American
mill sold 85.05 pounds of yarn spun from 100 pounds of cotton used, and
the English mill 89.21, CIVSA reported production of 90 pounds of yarn
per 100 pounds of cotton. If this is true, it might have been that CIVSA was
374 Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato
Table 10.6 Pounds per spindle and cost of labor per pound: CIVSA, the United States, and the
United Kingdom
CIVSA (ring spindles) U.S. (ring spindles) U.K. (mule spindles)
Yarn Pounds per  Cost of  Pounds per  Cost of  Pounds per  Cost of 
spindle labor  per spindle labor  per spindle labor  per 
(11 hrs) pound ($) (10 hrs) pound ($) (10 hrs) pound ($)
Warp 29 0.1951 0.0080 0.2440 0.0151 0.1940 0.0126
Warp 36 0.1339 0.0106 0.1730 0.0212 0.1440 0.0170
Weft 30 0.1673 0.0088 0.2590 0.0142 0.1810 0.0135
Weft 36 0.1121 0.0098 0.2060 0.0178 0.1370 0.0168
CIVSA vs U.S. mill (%) CIVSA vs U.K. mill (%)
Cost of  Cost of 
Pounds per  labor per  Pounds per  labor per 
spindle pound spindle pound
Warp 29 80 53 101 64
Warp 36 77 50 93 62
Weft 30 65 62 92 65
Weft 36 54 55 82 58
Sources: CV, Payrolls 1911 (Week 6) and U.S. House of Representatives, Cotton Manufactures (Wash-
ington, 1912), I, 410–12.
Notes: Costs presented here are the costs per pound of yarn as spun, excluding spooling or other pro-
cesses beyond spinning. Because pounds of yarn at CIVSA were not reported per spindle but per worker,
pounds per spindle were calculated using the reported average number of spindles per warp spinning
frame (380.27) and per weft spinning frame (428.74) at CIVSA in 1911, considering that one spinner
tended one spinning frame. Data from England and the United States was taken from the most eﬃcient
mill in each country on which the TariﬀBoard had information. Since there was no information for warp
yarn number 29 in England and the United States the ﬁgure for warp number 28 was used.
countries [including Mexico] except for the very low-wage competitors of Asia.” In weaving,
however, ﬁndings for CIVSA are in accordance with Clark’s argument. It is clear, however,
that the weaving technologies used were not equal throughout the world (Clark 1987, 51).
9. Output per spindle in Lancashire was considerably higher for ring spindles than for mule
spindles, particularly for lower counts of yarn. For example, in 1907, 100 ring spindles pro-
duced 167.6 pounds of yarn number 28 weekly, but 100 mule spindles produced only 111.6
pounds (Leunig 1996, 174).saving on cotton, which was relatively more expensive than in the United
States and in England.10
A comparison of the number of employees necessary to operate a
40,000-spindle spinning mill in the United States and Japan with the work-
ers employed in CIVSA’s spinning department (40,184 spindles) explains
how CIVSA paid lower labor costs than U.S. mills in yarn manufacturing.
While CIVSA employed almost twice the number of workers U.S. mills did
(183 percent), labor costs were only 70 percent of those in the United States
(see table 10.7). However, the Japanese industry, paying even lower wages,
but not competing with Mexican mills, had lower labor costs than CIVSA
(94 percent), in spite of employing more than twice the workers CIVSA did
(240 percent).
In weaving, however, lower wages at CIVSA were not enough to coun-
terbalance the extra labor it employed relative to the U.S. industry. As table
10.8 shows, CIVSA (with 1,380 looms) employed almost seven times (676
percent) the number of workers U.S. mills employed to tend a 1,000 loom
weaving mill, and paid more than twice the wages (219 percent). Because
wages per worker were higher in Mexico than in Japan, CIVSA paid more
than twice the total wages Japanese mills did (261 percent), although it em-
ployed almost the same number of workers (98 percent). While American
weaving mills required only 53 weavers to tend 1,000 looms, Japanese mills
required 700 weavers, and CIVSA 613 weavers (to tend 1,380 looms). Thus,
although American weavers earned $1.59, weavers at CIVSA $0.45, and
Japanese weavers $0.19 per day, their daily cost to the mills was $84.27,
$274.08, and $129.50, respectively. Labor costs at CIVSA’s weaving depart-
ment were far higher than in the United States, higher even than in Japan.
The crucial diﬀerence between the American mill compared here and the
Japanese and Mexican mills is that the U.S. ﬁrms used Northrop automatic
looms.11 When tending power looms “the most time-consuming tasks of
the weaver were, ﬁrst, to keep looms supplied with weft shuttles and, sec-
ond, to piece together broken threads. Both these operations required that
the machine be stopped.12 The Northrop system replaced the weft auto-
matically without stopping the loom, allowing for an increase in the num-
ber of looms tended.13 Additionally, Northrop looms stopped instantly
The Political Economy of Protectionism: The Mexican Textile Industry 375
10. According to the U.S. Tariﬀ Board, the cotton value at the American mill was so simi-
lar to that used by the English mill that the same price was used to make comparisons. U.S.
House of Representatives, (410). However, according to Gregory Clark, in 1910 “once the
costs of getting the cotton from the port to the mills are included, the major New England tex-
tile towns had an advantage of about $0.0015 per pound over Lancashire mills using Ameri-
can cotton.” Clark, “Why Isn’t the Whole World Developed?” (1987, 144).
11. Whereas in 1911 less than 1 percent of the looms working in England were automatic,
more than 30 percent of the American looms were automatic. In other words, 200,000 out of
665,049 looms working in 1910 (House of Representatives, 1912, 11, 169).
12. See Lazonick, Competitive Advantage, 163.
13. Anna P. Benson (1983, 27); George Draper & Sons (1896, 174).T
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.when a thread was broken, reducing imperfections in the cloth that ap-
peared whenever a weaver failed to repair a broken warp yarn immedi-
ately.14
While American weavers were tending an average of 18.87 automatic
looms each, CIVSA’s were only tending 2.25 power looms,15 and Japanese
weavers 1.43. At CIVSA, as in the English mills, weavers seldom tended
more than four plain power mills, while in the United States a weaver gen-
erally tended twenty automatic looms.16
In the United States, however, weavers working with plain power looms
rarely tended fewer than six, more often eight, and even twelve, if equipped
with warp-stop motions, which made work much easier.17 A U.S. weaver
tended so many looms because he (or she) tended strictly to the skilled
work of weaving, and all the other work was performed by other, less
skilled workers;18 this way of operating was called the “American Sys-
tem.”19 Although there were many unskilled workers helping weavers at
CIVSA and the Japanese textile mill, they represented only 26 percent and
18 percent, respectively, of the total labor force in the weaving department,
compared to 57 percent in the American mill. A signiﬁcant part of the
diﬀerence between the number of looms tended in the United States and
CIVSA may also have been due to the fact that CIVSA’s weavers were not
relieved of unskilled chores to the same extent that American weavers were.
Although it is diﬃcult to know which other tasks CIVSA’s weavers per-
formed besides strictly weaving, it is clear that cleaning the looms was part
of their weekly duties, since quarrels with employers on this issue often
arose at the mill. Some of the diﬀerence in labor productivity levels could
also have resulted from the fact that CIVSA produced a broader range of
fabrics than American mills, which usually specialized in certain types.
CIVSA payrolls indicate that the same weaver could produce as many as
four kinds of diﬀerent fabrics in a single week, which implied much addi-
tional work in resetting the loom for the diﬀerent types of weave.
Overall, one can conclude that in 1911 CIVSA was less productive than
the best English or American textile mills. While lower wages for spinning
helped CIVSA oﬀset its greater labor and machine requirements per
pound of yarn, this was not the case in weaving, particularly when com-
pared with the American industry. This, together with its greater cotton
and machinery costs, made it produce at higher costs than those of the
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14. See George Draper & Sons, 163–73.
15. On week six of 1911, 15 percent tended one loom, 60 percent two looms, 3 percent three
looms, and 22 percent four looms. (CV), Payrolls, 1911 (Week 6).
16. See House of Representatives (1912, 11).
17. Ibid.
18. Such as bringing the weft from the storeroom, sweeping, oiling, cleaning, examining the
roll of cloth, repairing imperfections, trimming the edges, picking oﬀ threads, and carrying
cloth to cloth room (House of Representatives, 1912, 480).
19. Ibid.American and British industries. Yet CIVSA’s production costs, even con-
sidering rates of return of 8 percent or 10 percent, were fairly similar to the
sales prices of English cloth of similar kinds. CIVSA would have thus re-
quired much lower duties than it had to be able to compete internationally.
The comparison between CIVSA and American and Japanese spinning
and weaving mills indicates that by 1911 CIVSA and the Japanese mills
had an important labor productivity gap with the United States. While
labor productivity was greater in CIVSA’s spinning department than in
the Japanese spinning mills, it was about the same in the case of weaving.
U.S. weaving mills appear to have been enjoying by then a huge advantage
vis-à-vis the rest of the world by their early employment of Northrop auto-
matic looms, helped by a better organization of labor within the mills.
Whereas Japanese low wages allowed its mills to produce at competitive
costs in spite of their low productivity of labor, this was not the case for
CIVSA, particularly in weaving.
As we will see in the following section, the development of future events
in Mexico would pose serious problems for CIVSA’s ability to compete in-
ternationally, by creating greater disadvantages in two aspects of the prob-
lem: real wages and the ability to introduce new technology and devise
changes in the ways labor is organized at the shop ﬂoor.
10.5 The Industry’s Secular Decline in International Competitiveness
During the Mexican Revolution (1910–20) a major transformation in
the relative power of workers and employers took place in the Orizaba tex-
tile mills, which would become an important factor to explain changes
in productivity and competitiveness from then on. From a laissez-faire
regime, where employers dealt with an unorganized labor force, which pre-
vailed until 1905, a totally diﬀerent situation emerged. The labor move-
ment grew stronger as a consequence of weaker governments and the need
for those groups seeking to establish themselves as governments to co-opt
the labor movement, whose support had become necessary to reestablish
peace (Gómez-Galvarriato 2002). Textile workers, and particularly those
in the Orizaba valley, acquired particular strategic relevance for the revo-
lutionary armies, given that they were the largest organized group along
the corridor that goes from the port of Veracruz to Mexico City (where
most textile mills were located and on which the railroad line Orizaba lies).
This corridor was the main commercial route that linked the capital to for-
eign nations, and the port of Veracruz collected the major share of import
and export duties, a substantial share of Mexico’s ﬁscal revenues. This gave
textile workers an important leverage in obtaining substantial improve-
ments in their living conditions and to substantially improve their relative
power vis-à-vis their employers.
By 1925 CIVSA workers were organized in powerful unions and work-
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the shop ﬂoor. Labor was now hired through collective contracts negoti-
ated between unions and employers, and it was now unions, rather than
employers, who made the major hiring and ﬁring decisions among blue
collar workers. The government, previously totally supportive of employ-
ers, was by then divided between the interests of employers and workers,
and in many crucial turning points it gave decisive support to labor at the
expense of company owners (see Gómez-Galvarriato 2002).
Although the levels of international competitiveness and comparative
productivity attained in 1911 by CIVSA were modest, as time passed they
deteriorated. A similar situation probably prevailed across the Mexican
textile industry as a whole. Thus, at least until the late 1980s, when the
Mexican economy opened up to international trade, the Porﬁriato would
become the period when the industry had reached its peak in terms of in-
ternational competitiveness.20
Productivity levels at Santa Rosa, measured as machine per worker and
production per worker, remained virtually unchanged from 1900 to 1950.
Looms per worker remained constant throughout the period, while meters
per worker produced weekly diminished by a small amount from the ﬁrst
decade of the century to the 1920s and a little more during the Revolu-
tionary decade; the same was true for spinning. However, because working
hours diminished and production per worker did not, productivity per
hour worked increased (see tables 10.9 and 10.10).21Whereasreal wages in-
creased substantially after 1917, productivity did not; therefore, real wages
per meter of output rose notably after that date (see ﬁgure 10.1). This re-
sult explains, in part, the deterioration in proﬁtability rates that the ﬁrm ex-
perienced after that date (see table 10.11).
After 1930 the number of looms tended per weaver gradually increased,
reaching almost four. This implied an improvement in productivity rates in
terms of meters per worker, although with a concomitant small reduction
in meters per loom. Yet this represents a minor increase in productivity
when compared to what was attainable by introducing automatic looms.
In the spinning department there was no parallel productivity improve-
ment after 1930. On the contrary, data shows a reduction in productivity
after 1940. Further research must be undertaken to understand its causes.
Given the radical change experienced on the shop ﬂoor from control by
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20. From 1984 to 1988 a substantial reduction of the tariﬀ fractions subject to import per-
mits was carried out. Whereas in June 1985 88.4 percent of yarn and cloth imports were sub-
ject to import permits, these were reduced to 3.4 percent in December 1985 and to 1.9 percent
in May 1988. Average ad valorem tariﬀs went down from 42.5 percent in December 1985 to
13.8 percent in December 1987 (Carlos Márquez Padilla, 1994, 110–11).
21. This would be in accordance with factual evidence introduced by Karl Marx that, when
the workday was shortened from twelve to eleven hours, output per workday actually in-
creased “entirely as a result of steadier application to the work and a more economical use of
time on the part of the workers.” Karl Marx, in Lazonick, Competitive Advantage on the Shop
Floor (63).Table 10.9 Weavers’ productivity, 1900–30
Meters per worker Meters  Looms  Real wage  Real wage  Meters 
per loom  per  per meter  per week  per loom 
Year Weekly Hourly (weekly) worker ($) ($) per hour
1900 533.3 7.4 231.9 2.30 0.008 3.66 3.09
1901 676.8 9.4 294.3 2.30 0.008 3.99 3.34
1902 683.4 9.5 298.4 2.29 0.008 4.37 4.40
1903 540.5 7.5 229.0 2.36 0.008 3.55 3.22
1904 527.4 7.3 211.0 2.50 0.008 3.48 3.70
1905 723.1 10.0 292.7 2.47 0.008 4.81 3.28
1906 623.4 8.7 238.9 2.61 0.009 3.83 2.74
1907 663.9 9.2 257.3 2.58 0.009 4.44 3.51
1908 634.5 8.8 275.9 2.30 0.010 5.68 3.85
1909 712.6 9.9 300.7 2.37 0.009 5.43 3.93
1910 561.5 8.2 257.6 2.18 0.009 4.78 4.41
1911 418.4 6.3 181.1 2.31 0.009 3.71 3.82
1912 694.3 11.0 276.6 2.51 0.010 7.91 5.01
1913 615.6 9.8 218.3 2.82 0.011 7.62 4.30
1914 774.6 12.3 289.0 2.68 0.008 6.72 5.03
1915 598.2 10.5 229.2 2.61 0.004 3.35 4.43
1916 703.2 12.4 236.0 2.98 0.008 6.46 4.85
1917 572.9 11.3 220.3 2.60 0.013 10.61 4.33
1918 542.3 10.7 203.9 2.66 0.012 8.19 4.58
1919 421.8 8.3 160.4 2.63 0.012 7.25 4.18
1920 535.1 10.5 209.0 2.56 0.011 8.52 4.74
1921 627.7 12.3 266.0 2.36 0.012 10.19 4.84
1922 558.3 11.0 229.8 2.43 0.017 13.23 4.25
1923 548.2 10.8 227.5 2.41 0.018 13.56 3.69
1924 542.6 10.7 220.6 2.46 0.015 11.52 5.04
1925 592.7 11.7 248.0 2.39 0.014 12.70 4.96
1926 628.5 12.4 265.2 2.37 0.013 12.68 5.18
1927 572.0 11.3 239.3 2.39 0.018 15.33 4.86
1928 631.0 12.4 251.4 2.51 0.018 15.49 4.52
1929 617.2 12.1 250.9 2.46 0.018 16.09 4.74
1931 824.1 16.6 240.0 3.43 0.016 13.48 4.85
1932 537.0 16.8 157.9 3.40 0.017 9.38 4.94
1933 929.9 19.4 275.5 3.38 0.015 13.74 5.74
1934 928.4 19.3 269.8 3.44 0.014 13.02 5.62
1935 842.5 17.0 248.4 3.39 0.016 13.54 5.02
1936 681.6 15.6 201.0 3.39 0.018 12.18 4.59
1937 559.2 12.2 165.0 3.40 0.020 11.01 3.59
1938 624.8 14.2 183.8 3.40 0.019 11.85 4.18
1939 680.1 14.2 200.5 3.39 0.023 15.85 4.18
1940 527.5 13.9 155.1 3.40 0.024 12.65 4.08
1941 761.5 14.6 216.0 3.53 0.022 16.88 4.15
1942 760.7 15.8 195.0 3.90 0.020 14.95 4.06
1943 773.1 16.1 196.5 3.93 0.019 14.60 4.09
1944 787.0 16.4 200.9 3.92 0.016 12.47 4.19
1945 595.5 15.3 151.4 3.93 0.018 10.49 3.88
1946 794.1 16.5 201.9 3.93 0.018 13.93 4.21
1947 732.9 15.3 199.9 3.66 0.019 13.61 4.16
(continued)managers to a situation where the union had great inﬂuence, it might seem
surprising that productivity levels did not fall as a result of the Revolution.
The fact that they did not means that the Santa Rosa union was eﬀective at
guaranteeing workers’ discipline and eﬀort. Moreover, workers were able
to produce more per hour as the shift was reduced, despite the fact that
they were performing their tasks with basically the same machinery they
had worked with during the Porﬁriato. The intensity of labor was higher
during the shorter working day, perhaps because workers were not as tired.
Since they were paid per piece, they tried to produce as much as their
strength allowed. In addition, once the shift was reduced, companies be-
came more strict about arrival and departure times.22
However, this was not all that was required to keep the industry’s inter-
national competitiveness at the levels it had maintained during the Porﬁri-
ato, let alone improve them. The reduction in investment rates at CIVSA
described in ﬁgure 10.2 were partly a consequence of the decline in proﬁt
rates. A regression of Santa Rosa’s ﬁxed assets growth on the average of the
previous three years’ proﬁt rates yields the following relationship.23
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Table 10.9 (continued)
Meters per worker Meters  Looms  Real wage  Real wage  Meters 
per loom  per  per meter  per week  per loom 
Year Weekly Hourly (weekly) worker ($) ($) per hour
1948 745.6 15.5 209.5 3.56 0.017 12.33 4.37
1949 776.9 16.2 213.8 3.63 0.019 15.15 4.45
1950 788.8 16.4 207.6 3.67 0.018 14.19 4.32
1900–10 625.5 8.7 262.5 2.39 0.009 4.36 3.59
1911–20 587.6 10.3 222.4 2.64 0.010 7.03 4.53
1921–29 590.9 11.6 244.3 2.42 0.016 13.42 4.68
1931–40 713.5 15.9 209.7 3.40 0.018 12.67 4.68
1941–50 751.6 15.8 199.3 3.77 0.018 13.86 4.19
Sources: Meters per loom and wage per meter was obtained from a sample of thirty weavers from CV,
Payrolls, June and November 1900–30 and looms per workers were taken from CV, Payrolls Week 6,
1900–30. From 1900 to 1929 wages deﬂated with Index I AB, Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato, The Impact of
Revolution, 700, 703, with Index I AB. From 1929 to 1942 wages were deﬂated with Federico Bach and
Margarita Reyna (1943, 1–63). From 1943 to 1950 the price index came from NAFINSA (1963, 109).
22. Once the eight-hour shift was established punctually became very important for the
company, since it considered that the shift should consist of eight eﬀective hours. Thus the
gates were closed strictly on time. On June 12, 1917, for example, Rio Blanco shut out between
sixty and seventy workers who had arrived late. At ﬁrst, this factory policy elicited com-
plaints, but then workers apparently became used to it Archive of the Compañía Industrial
de Orizaba S.A. (CD) correspondence, letter from Río Blanco oﬃce to the governor of Ver-
acruz, Cordoba, June 13, 1917.
23. Where GROWTHtis investment in ﬁxed assets in Santa Rosa as a percentage of total as-
sets in the year t, and PROFITRATEt is CIVSA’s return on assets in the year t. Two other ver-
sions of regression were run, one using the average of proﬁtrates for two years instead of three
and another using the logarithms of the variables. Both closely resembled the one shown.Table 10.10 Spinners’ productivity, 1900–30 (1900 pesos)
Spinners (Warp No. 29) Spinners (Weft No. 30)
Real  Kilos per  Kilos per  Real  Kilos per  Kilos per 
wage worker worker wage worker worker
Year per kilo (weekly) (hourly) per kilo (weekly) (hourly)
1900 0.029 244.2 3.14 0.038 277.2 3.61
1901 0.029 220.9 3.02 0.037 222.0 3.12
1902 0.027 241.0 3.35 0.035 262.0 3.68
1903 0.027 234.3 3.12 0.035 232.0 3.03
1904 0.026 181.5 2.78 0.034 238.8 2.75
1905 0.026 256.3 3.05 0.034 239.7 2.91
1906 0.012 231.8 3.22 0.034 221.0 2.44
1907 0.036 225.3 3.13 0.038 227.9 2.49
1908 0.035 213.4 2.96 0.034 231.3 3.47
1909 0.030 229.4 3.19 0.034 225.1 3.75
1910 0.026 281.9 4.70 0.031 201.8 3.36
1911 0.027 232.3 4.22 0.029 219.4 3.99
1912 0.028 253.8 4.23 0.032 211.1 4.00
1913 0.028 212.9 3.88 0.032 205.3 3.95
1914 0.021 208.1 3.50 0.024 218.3 3.89
1915 0.011 190.7 3.68 0.012 214.8 3.48
1916 0.021 183.0 3.90 0.33 211.6 4.49
1917 0.037 176.3 3.67 0.040 212.5 4.22
1918 0.032 178.5 4.46 0.035 215.2 4.70
1919 0.034 160.3 4.21 0.035 216.9 5.07
1920 0.029 176.5 4.17 0.032 236.3 4.73
1921 0.036 190.3 4.24 0.037 206.3 4.35
1922 0.045 198.0 5.54 0.044 205.0 4.73
1923 0.044 204.9 3.90 0.046 210.1 3.93
1924 0.043 185.1 4.73 0.046 204.5 5.20
1925 0.037 208.2 4.14 0.044 220.4 4.71
1926 0.038 242.6 4.74 0.043 224.9 5.00
1927 0.048 219.9 3.98 0.049 257.8 5.61
1928 0.053 224.7 4.41 0.056 268.8 5.14
1929 0.051 268.2 5.09 0.054 260.6 5.40
1931 0.052 256.8 5.18 0.047 346.0 6.99
1932 0.059 190.5 4.65 0.057 296.2 5.99
1933 0.047 278.4 5.65 0.056 245.4 5.95
1934 0.046 275.5 5.74 0.045 281.4 6.94
1935 0.052 197.0 4.40 0.057 293.8 5.40
1936 0.049 109.6 2.76 0.062 319.1 2.43
1937 0.047 126.3 2.77 0.052 333.0 4.54
1938 0.054 131.7 3.20 0.050 298.4 3.77
1939 0.058 132.0 2.75 0.074 239.8 3.92
1940 0.076 139.3 3.53 0.061 191.5 4.19
1941 0.058 92.8 3.17 0.060 120.0 5.94
1942 0.055 103.9 3.66 0.065 105.7 4.34
1943 0.050 110.7 4.03 0.057 212.3 6.58
1944 0.048 119.0 4.24 0.049 201.9 3.38
(continued )GROWTHt    0.005   0.62(PROFITRATEt 1   PROFITRATEt 2 
( 0.29) (2.02)
  PROFITRATEt 3)/3
R2   0.14, adjusted R2   0.10, N   28
with t-statistics in parentheses. Past proﬁts are used as a proxy of expected
future proﬁts, of which investment in ﬁxed assets should be a function. Re-
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Fig. 10.1 Average weekly and hourly real wages (pesos of 1900)
Source: CV, Payrolls 1900–30.
Table 10.10 (continued)
Spinners (Warp No. 29) Spinners (Weft No. 30)
Real  Kilos per  Kilos per  Real  Kilos per  Kilos per 
wage worker worker wage worker worker
Year per kilo (weekly) (hourly) per kilo (weekly) (hourly)
1945 0.045 99.8 4.27 0.055 154.9 4.00
1946 0.051 107.0 4.46 0.056 198.8 4.55
1947 0.053 91.9 2.83 0.057 188.1 4.20
1948 0.049 146.5 4.89 0.055 190.1 4.91
1949 0.052 107.7 3.88 0.057 165.6 4.38
1950 0.052 119.6 3.93 0.055 138.5 4.90
1900–10 0.028 232.7 3.24 0.035 234.4 3.15
1911–20 0.027 197.2 3.99 0.030 216.2 4.25
1921–29 0.044 215.8 4.53 0.047 228.7 4.90
1931–40 0.054 183.7 4.06 0.056 284.5 5.01
1941–50 0.051 109.9 3.93 0.057 167.6 4.72
Source: A sample was taken from CV, Payrolls, June and November 1900–30. Wages were deﬂated.Table 10.11 CIVSA’s return on assets and equity, 1899–1929
Price  Return on  Return on  Return on  Return on 
Year indexc assetsa (%) equitya (%) assetsb (%) equityb (%)
1899 92.50 –1.42 –1.63 –1.49 –1.76
1900 100.00 5.67 6.94 5.74 6.94
1901 104.72 4.35 5.29 4.32 5.05
1902 114.89 12.18 14.54 11.39 12.65
1903 115.29 11.73 13.79 11.02 11.96
1904 116.57 12.42 14.46 11.56 12.40
1905 117.94 12.41 14.39 11.41 12.20
1906 117.79 7.75 8.95 7.11 7.60
1907 122.35 8.17 9.47 7.32 7.74
1908 123.97 4.86 5.70 4.31 4.60
1909 132.24 6.34 7.48 5.33 5.66
1910 146.45 5.91 7.14 4.65 4.88
1900–10 7.53 8.88 6.89 7.49
1911 146.05 3.83 4.67 3.02 3.20
1912 148.68 9.28 11.14 7.24 7.50
1913 150.70 6.10 7.19 4.73 4.77
1914 171.90 –0.39 –0.44 –0.27 –0.26
1915 196.09 –2.63 –2.86 –1.63 –1.46
1916 223.68 6.72 7.19 3.68 3.21
1917 255.14 13.61 15.77 7.42 6.18
1918 305.88 8.04 9.21 4.07 3.01
1919 293.42 11.58 12.71 6.14 4.33
1920 319.01 11.01 12.68 5.77 3.97
1911–20 6.72 7.73 4.02 3.45
1921 285.68 14.81 17.49 8.41 6.12
1922 228.96 11.4 13.23 7.42 5.78
1923 200.26 8.96 10.06 6.32 5.02
1924 207.44 1.76 1.89 1.19 0.91
1925 241.69 6.61 6.94 4.04 2.87
1926 238.46 –3.20 –3.33 –1.97 –1.40
1927 210.63 7.23 7.53 4.82 3.57
1928 197.86 2.95 3.13 2.08 1.58
1929 201.44 2.47 2.59 1.71 1.29
1921–29 5.89 6.61 3.78 2.86
Sources: CV, Balances Generales y Estados de Resultados 1898–1910.
aCalculated using nominal equity and assets.
bCalculated correcting equity and ﬁxed assets for inﬂation.
cPrice Index II, AB, Gold. Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato, The Impact of Revolution,table A4.15
in Appendix to chapter 4.
dNet of depreciation.sults of this regression show a clear association between investment and
proﬁts for CIVSA, indicating that the decline in proﬁt rates after the Por-
ﬁriato accounts for a signiﬁcant part of the drop in investment rates after
1912.24 Yet, there were other forces behind the reduction of investment
rates; namely, labor regulation restrictions on the adoption of new tech-
nology and the tariﬀ policy adopted in the late 1920s.
New technology adopted by the textile industry worldwide was not in-
troduced into Mexican mills. One of the most notable improvements in tex-
tile production was the introduction of automatic looms.25 Other impor-
tant technological changes that became widespread in the 1920s were the
following: (1) double-length looms, which increased weavers’ productivity;
(2) the one-process picker (batiente de un solo proceso), which reduced bale-
breaking, lapping, and picking to only one step; (3) high-speed warping
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Fig. 10.2 Investments in real estate, machinery, and equipment at CIVSA (as per-
centage of total ﬁxed assets)
Source: CIVSA and Santa Rosa General Balances 1900–1929.
24. A similar regression was run by Susan Wolcott and Gregory Clark for the Indian textile
industry (using panel data of several mills from 1907–38), yielding very similar results. Susan
Wolcott and Gregory Clark (1999, 407).
25. México, Secretaría de la Economía Nacional (Juan Chávez Orozco) (1933, 66).(altos estirajes), which reduced the number of times yarn was passed
through the ﬂy frames (veloces); and (4) the use of artiﬁcial silk (rayon) to
mix with cotton.26
Automatic looms were not introduced by CIVSA in the 1900s because
they demanded higher investment—their price was two-and-a-half times
that of an ordinary power loom. Moreover, at their early stage of develop-
ment, they required more technical assistance than power looms. Because
specialized technical assistance was relatively expensive in Mexico, this
meant a signiﬁcant additional cost.27 However, because this technology
was new and not so widespread at the time, it was not so crucial for the
Mexican textile industry to adopt it then as later, when, after being tested
and improved, it became standard throughout the world. In the 1920s, cer-
tain Mexican textile companies tried to acquire automatic looms, but faced
the opposition of unions against this labor-saving machinery.28
In the early 1920s, CIVSA attempted to install 100 Northrop automatic
looms. However, its union did not permit them and the company was
forced to sell them at a discount to several other companies in small sets.
Atoyac Textil, one of the mills of the Rivero Quijano family, bought some
of them. However, this company was also unable to put them into opera-
tion because of problems like those at Santa Rosa. Moreover, according to
one of Atoyac Textil’s owners, Jesús Rivero Quijano, it was necessary to
have at least a hundred automatic looms running for a company to reap the
beneﬁts of this new technology; even if they had been adopted at Atoyac
there would not have been enough to show what automation could ac-
complish (Quijano, 278).
In 1923, Atoyac Textil decided to give another chance to automatic
looms, buying twenty-four Staﬀord looms. However, “in order to intro-
duce them it was necessary that the president of Staﬀord Looms travel
to Mexico to have an interview with General Calles and President
Obregón, to deal later with Luis N. Morones about the installation and
operation of these machines (Quijano, 278). The government accepted
the installation of these automatic looms on condition that they were
considered an “exhibition.” Once they were mounted, however, unions
blocked their operation. The worker who ran the looms was stabbed to
death. His successor soon started receiving death threats and promptly
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26. See Segunda Ponencia de la Companñía Industrial de Orizaba S.A. in Primera Conven-
ción Mexicana de Empresarios Textiles (Rama del Algodón), April 9–12, 1945, 176–180; and
Jesús Rivero Quijano (1990, 239–48, 257–62, and 279–80).
27. A full discussion of these issues can be found in Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato, The Im-
pact of Revolution, 152–56.
28. Graham Clark suggests in his study of the Mexican textile industry of 1909 that oppo-
sition from workers to automatic looms was already present then. However, CIVSA managers
never referred to labor discontent as a reason for not adopting automatic looms. Moreover,
they were able to put some automatic looms in operation in the early 1900s without any prob-
lems with workers. (Graham Clark 1909, 22).resigned. No one else dared to tend the looms, and they were abandoned
until some technicians transformed them into ordinary power looms
(Rivero, 278).
In the late 1920s, a legal restriction on the adoption of new technologies
such as automatic looms, one-process pickers, and high-speed warping
wasimposed. The wage-list that was designed as a result of the Convention
of Workers and Industrialists of 1925–27 ﬁxed the maximum number of
machines per worker and established speciﬁc wages-per-piece. Under these
conditions, industrialists had no incentive to introduce better machinery
because it would not enable them to reduce labor costs, since wages-per-
piece and the workers-per-machine had to remain invariable.29
In spite of the important technological changes that the textile industry
had undergone since 1912, no new technical studies were made to deﬁne
the 1925–27 industrywide labor contract. The same technical principles
adopted to build the 1912 Tariﬀ(based on the Blackburn wage-list of 1905)
were used for the new wage-list.30 In spinning, the concept of one worker
per machine prevailed, forcing Mexican mills to adopt larger spinning ma-
chines than was recommended by their builders, or to join two spinning
machines, with several technical problems.31
As in England, by lowering piece-rates on larger and faster spinning
frames, wage-lists encouraged capitalists to try to maximize spindles per
workers.32 In contrast, in weaving, by setting piece-rates irrespective of the
number of speed looms tended, wage schedules encouraged employers to
try to minimize the number of looms per weaver. This was so because “for
a given intensity of labor, the lower the number of looms per weaver, the
faster each loom could be run, the higher the output per loom, and the
lower total unit factor costs.”33
In carding, the 1925–27 wage-list, like the one created in 1912, estab-
lished that one worker should operate eight carding machines. However,
by introducing simple modiﬁcations to machinery and organization, it be-
came possible for one worker to tend forty carding machines with no addi-
tional eﬀort. The wage-list created no incentive for Mexican mills to intro-
duce these changes since, if they were allowed to implement them, mills
would have to pay ﬁve times more to the card tender that remained work-
ing and give severance pay to the four who would have to be dismissed.
These costs, together with the investment required to modernize the card-
390 Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato
29. México, Secretaría de la Economía Nacional (Juan Chávez Orozo, 67).
30. Ibid., 418.
31. Ibid.
32. In England between 1896 and 1914 spinning frames were enlarged in order to maximize
eﬀort and at the same time comply with the wage-lists. See Lazonick, Competitive Advantage
(163).
33. Ibid., 163–64.ing machines, were greater than the beneﬁts the mills would obtain through
cost reductions (Naciones Unidas 1951, 14).
The decision to establish ﬁxed wage schedules per piece and limits on ma-
chines per worker was not made unknowingly. In 1926, the Saco-Lowell
Shops, fearing that the agreements of the convention would aﬀect demand
for their machinery in Mexico, sent a letter to the president of the conven-
tion, explaining how detrimental the new regulations were to the adoption
of new technology. The letter described the advantages of automatic looms
as well as that of machinery speciﬁcally designed for the processing of scrap
cotton. It explained why these innovations would not be adopted with the
new wage-list and regulations proposed by the convention.34 However, the
majority of votes in the convention were in favor of the rigid wage schedule.
Workers regarded modern machines as a threat to employment, industrial-
ists as a threat to the survival of their decrepit mills, while government per-
ceived the threat of social discontent. It was easier to raise tariﬀs and let
the industry survive as it was. The overrepresentation of smaller, more old-
fashioned mills at the convention may also have contributed to this result.35
CIVSA documents show the eﬀects of the convention regulations on
the company’s investment decisions. In 1927, for example, double-length
looms, not considered in the convention’s wage-list, were installed in Santa
Rosa.36 However, a year later, the CIVSA board of directors decided to re-
move them because the wages demanded by the Santa Rosa union for their
operators made production too costly.
In May 1929, CIVSA’s main engineer presented a cost-beneﬁt analysis,
explaining the advisability of installing new high-speed-warping machines,
which would generate substantial savings. CIVSA’s board of directors de-
cided to postpone their purchase until they were able to get a fair wage rate
for operating these new machines. Together with CIDOSA, CIVSA started
negotiations with the Ministry of Industry on this matter; at least until the
end of 1930, however, they proved fruitless.37
Although the eﬀects of rigid regulations on technological innovation
must have been worse in those states, such as Veracruz, where the labor
movement was strongest, contemporary studies on the textile industry in-
dicate that they prevailed throughout the entire country.38 Aggregate data
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34. Saco Lowell Shops to Presidencia de la Convención, August 7, 1926, Archivo General
de la Nacíon, (AGN), Departamento del Trabajo (DT), 979/3.
35. According to the Convention’s rules every mill had a vote regardless of its size. This gave
a majority vote to smaller, usually more outdated, mills. México, Secretaría de la Economía
Nacional, (Moisés T. de la Peña), (1934, 48).
36. CV, AC, July 12, 1927.
37. CV, Actas del Consejo del Administracíon (Board Meetings Minutes [AC]), May 14,
1929.
38. See México, Secretaria de la Economía Nacional, (Juan Chávez Orozco), (1933, 67),
and México, Secretaría de la Economía Nacional (Moisés T. de la Peña), (1934, 187–91).for Mexico’s textile industry show little investment.39 Although some new
factories were built in the 1920s, most of them were small establishments
devoted to the production of knitwear (bonetería), mainly of artiﬁcial silk.
This is why, although the number of factories increased by 22 percent from
1921 to 1930, the number of active spindles and looms increased only by 9
percent and 8 percent, respectively (see table 10.12). Machinery per worker
(measured in loom equivalents), which increased during the last decade of
the Porﬁriato by 18 percent, increased by only 7 percent during the twen-
ties. During the Revolution, loom equivalents per worker grew on a per-
shift basis because of the reduction in the length of the workday. And labor
productivity increased between 1926 and 1930, not only when measured by
loom equivalents per shift, but also when measured in sales and production
per worker. However, this was the result of (a) the implementation of the
Convention’s wages per piece, which increased labor intensity, and (b) the
reduction of employment and hours worked per mill as a consequence of
the Depression. According to contemporary observers, “This increase was
by no means the result of an improvement in machinery in the mills.”40
Increased protection levels were necessary to keep Mexican mills run-
ning. As tables 10.4 and 10.5 show, there was a substantial increase in ad
valorem tariﬀs after 1927, which came together with the conclusion of the
Workers’ and Industrialists’ Convention. Before that year, governments
that came out of the Revolution had been actually less protectionist than
the Porﬁrian government. After 1916, Carranza’s government began to
pursue a liberalization tariﬀ policy that drastically diminished tariﬀs on
basic commodities, such as cloth. The rationale behind this policy was
twofold. On the one hand, during 1917 Mexico suﬀered a severe shortage
of products, which generated a signiﬁcant increase in prices. Reducing
tariﬀs was therefore an emergency strategy designed by the government to
cope with the enormous scarcity of goods and the rising prices the country
was facing (Cosío Villegas, 99). However, there was also a theoretical rea-
son behind the liberalization policy. At the First National Congress of In-
dustrialists held in Mexico City in September 1917, Alberto J. Pani, Min-
ister of Industry and Commerce, made it clear in his inaugural address that
392 Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato
39. National data on the cotton textile industry was obtained from the following sources:
For 1900–11: México, SHCP, Boletín de Estadística Fiscal, several issues, México, The Mexi-
can Year Book 1908 (523–31). For 1912: AGN, DT 5/4/4 “Manifestaciónes presentadas por
los fabricantes de hilados y tejidos de algodón durante enero a junio de 1912.” For 1913:
AGN, DT, 31/2/4, “Estadística semestral de las fcas, de hilados y tejidos de algodón de la
Reública Mexicana correspondiente al semestre de 1913.” For 1914–20: Stephen Haber,
(1989, 124); and México, Secretaría de la Economía Nacional, (Moisés T. de la Peña), 14, 126.
For 1921–24: México, Poder Ejecutivo Federal, Departamento de Estadística Nacional, As-
pectos Económicos de un Quinquenio: 1921–1925, 8–29; Boletín de Estadística, January 1924,
52–55; Estadística Nacional, September 30, 1925, 5–17. For 1925–30: México, SHCP, De-
partmento de Impuestos Especiales, Sección de Hilados y Tejidos, “Estadísticas del Ramo de
Hilados y Tejidos de Algodón y de Lana,” typewritten reports.
40. See México, Secretaría de la Economía Nacional (Juan Chávez Orozco), (1933, 63).T
a
b
l
e
 
1
0
.
1
2
T
h
e
 
M
e
x
i
c
a
n
 
t
e
x
t
i
l
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
 
1
9
0
0
–
1
9
3
4
A
c
t
i
v
e
 
W
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
C
o
t
t
o
n
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
L
o
o
m
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
L
o
o
m
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
C
o
t
t
o
n
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
p
e
r
 
Y
e
a
r
m
i
l
l
s
S
p
i
n
d
l
e
s
L
o
o
m
s
W
o
r
k
e
r
s
(
a
d
j
)
C
o
n
s
.
(
n
o
m
i
n
a
l
;
 
$
)
(
i
n
 
1
9
0
0
 
p
e
s
o
s
)
p
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
p
e
r
 
s
h
i
f
t
p
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
 
(
$
)
1
9
0
0
1
3
4
5
5
7
,
3
9
1
1
7
,
2
0
2
2
6
,
7
6
4
2
6
,
7
6
4
2
8
,
9
9
0
3
5
,
4
5
9
3
5
,
4
5
9
0
.
8
7
0
.
8
7
1
,
0
8
3
1
,
3
2
5
1
9
0
1
1
3
3
6
0
2
,
2
2
3
1
8
,
8
8
5
2
7
,
6
6
3
2
7
,
6
6
3
3
0
,
2
6
2
3
3
,
8
7
7
3
5
,
5
5
3
0
.
9
2
0
.
9
2
1
,
0
9
4
1
,
2
8
5
1
9
0
2
1
2
4
5
7
5
,
3
0
4
1
7
,
9
7
4
2
5
,
3
1
6
2
5
,
3
1
6
2
7
,
6
2
8
2
8
,
7
8
0
2
7
,
9
3
9
0
.
9
6
0
.
9
6
1
,
0
9
1
1
,
1
0
4
1
9
0
3
1
1
5
6
3
0
,
2
0
1
2
0
,
1
2
4
2
6
,
2
4
9
2
6
,
2
4
9
2
7
,
5
1
2
3
6
,
9
0
7
3
1
,
3
3
9
1
.
0
3
1
.
0
3
1
,
0
4
8
1
,
1
9
4
1
9
0
4
1
1
9
6
3
2
,
0
1
8
2
0
,
3
2
6
2
7
,
0
3
3
2
7
,
0
3
3
2
8
,
8
4
1
4
2
,
5
1
1
3
4
,
6
4
6
1
.
0
1
1
.
0
1
1
,
0
6
7
1
,
2
8
2
1
9
0
5
1
2
7
6
6
6
,
6
5
9
2
1
,
9
3
2
2
9
,
4
8
3
2
9
,
4
8
3
3
1
,
2
3
0
5
1
,
2
1
4
4
6
,
0
9
7
0
.
9
9
0
.
9
9
1
,
0
5
9
1
,
5
6
4
1
9
0
6
1
3
0
6
8
3
,
7
3
9
2
2
,
7
7
6
3
1
,
6
7
3
3
1
,
6
7
3
3
5
,
8
2
6
5
1
,
1
7
1
4
4
,
8
9
4
0
.
9
6
0
.
9
6
1
,
1
3
1
1
,
4
1
7
1
9
0
7
1
2
9
6
9
3
,
8
4
2
2
3
,
5
0
7
3
3
,
1
3
2
3
3
,
1
3
2
3
6
,
6
5
4
5
1
,
6
8
6
4
1
,
3
2
6
0
.
9
4
0
.
9
4
1
,
1
0
6
1
,
2
4
7
1
9
0
8
1
3
2
7
3
2
,
8
7
6
2
4
,
9
9
7
3
5
,
8
1
6
3
5
,
8
1
6
3
6
,
0
4
0
5
4
,
9
3
4
4
5
,
3
0
3
0
.
9
2
0
.
9
2
1
,
0
0
6
1
,
2
6
5
1
9
0
9
1
2
9
7
2
6
,
2
7
8
2
5
,
3
2
7
3
2
,
2
2
9
3
2
,
2
2
9
3
5
,
4
3
5
4
3
,
3
7
0
3
6
,
6
5
6
1
.
0
3
1
.
0
3
1
,
0
9
9
1
,
1
3
7
1
9
1
0
1
2
3
7
0
2
,
8
7
4
2
5
,
0
1
7
3
1
,
9
6
3
3
1
,
9
6
3
3
4
,
7
3
6
5
0
,
6
5
1
3
9
,
1
1
9
1
.
0
2
1
.
0
2
1
,
0
8
7
1
,
2
2
4
1
9
1
1
1
1
9
7
2
5
,
2
9
7
2
4
,
4
3
6
3
2
,
1
4
7
3
2
,
1
4
7
3
4
,
5
6
8
5
1
,
3
4
8
3
9
,
2
8
6
1
.
0
1
1
.
0
1
1
,
0
7
5
1
,
2
2
2
1
9
1
2
1
2
7
7
6
2
,
1
4
9
2
6
,
8
0
1
3
2
,
1
2
8
2
6
,
7
7
3
3
2
,
3
6
6
5
2
,
8
4
7
3
8
,
8
0
4
1
.
1
0
1
.
3
1
1
,
0
0
7
1
,
2
0
8
1
9
1
3
1
1
8
7
5
2
,
8
0
4
2
6
,
7
9
1
3
2
,
6
4
1
2
7
,
2
0
1
3
2
,
8
2
1
1
.
0
7
1
.
2
9
1
,
0
0
6
1
9
1
4
9
0
1
9
1
5
8
4
1
9
1
6
9
3
1
9
1
7
9
2
5
7
3
,
0
7
2
2
0
,
4
8
9
2
2
,
1
8
7
1
4
,
7
9
1
6
4
,
1
3
0
2
9
,
9
7
4
1
.
2
1
1
.
8
1
1
,
3
5
1
1
9
1
8
1
0
4
6
8
9
,
1
7
3
2
5
,
0
1
7
2
7
,
6
8
0
1
8
,
4
5
3
4
8
,
5
6
7
1
9
,
5
7
4
1
.
1
8
1
.
7
7
7
0
7
1
9
1
9
1
1
0
7
4
9
,
2
3
7
2
7
,
0
2
0
3
3
,
1
8
5
2
2
,
1
2
3
6
9
,
7
7
8
2
5
,
1
6
9
1
.
0
6
1
.
5
9
7
5
8
1
9
2
0
1
2
0
7
5
3
,
8
3
7
2
7
,
3
0
1
3
7
,
9
3
6
2
5
,
2
9
1
3
1
,
6
9
4
1
2
0
,
4
9
2
3
6
,
8
9
0
0
.
9
4
1
.
4
1
8
3
5
9
7
2
1
9
2
1
1
2
1
7
7
0
,
9
4
5
2
8
,
4
0
9
3
8
,
2
2
7
2
5
,
4
8
5
3
5
,
9
2
4
9
3
,
9
4
2
2
8
,
3
2
9
0
.
9
7
1
.
4
5
9
4
0
7
4
1
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)T
a
b
l
e
 
1
0
.
1
2
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
A
c
t
i
v
e
 
W
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
C
o
t
t
o
n
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
L
o
o
m
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
L
o
o
m
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
C
o
t
t
o
n
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
p
e
r
 
Y
e
a
r
m
i
l
l
s
S
p
i
n
d
l
e
s
L
o
o
m
s
W
o
r
k
e
r
s
(
a
d
j
)
C
o
n
s
.
(
n
o
m
i
n
a
l
;
 
$
)
(
i
n
 
1
9
0
0
 
p
e
s
o
s
)
p
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
p
e
r
 
s
h
i
f
t
p
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
 
(
$
)
1
9
2
2
1
1
9
8
0
3
,
2
3
0
2
9
,
5
2
1
3
9
,
6
7
7
2
6
,
4
5
1
3
4
,
6
5
4
8
5
,
0
2
3
2
6
,
7
6
6
0
.
9
7
1
.
4
5
8
7
3
6
7
5
1
9
2
3
1
1
0
8
0
2
,
3
6
3
2
9
,
6
6
8
3
9
,
6
2
9
2
6
,
4
1
9
3
2
,
3
4
4
9
7
,
4
9
0
3
5
,
3
7
6
0
.
9
7
1
.
4
6
8
1
6
8
9
3
1
9
2
4
1
1
6
8
1
2
,
1
6
5
2
9
,
8
8
8
3
7
,
7
3
2
2
5
,
1
5
5
3
0
,
5
1
7
9
6
,
4
3
5
3
4
,
4
2
9
1
.
0
3
1
.
5
4
8
0
9
9
1
2
1
9
2
5
1
3
0
8
3
1
,
5
2
4
3
0
,
8
0
0
4
3
,
1
9
9
2
8
,
7
9
9
4
0
,
9
9
7
1
0
8
,
3
9
6
3
8
,
0
3
8
0
.
9
2
1
.
3
9
9
4
9
8
8
1
1
9
2
6
1
3
8
8
4
2
,
7
9
3
3
1
,
2
9
6
4
4
,
2
5
0
2
9
,
5
0
0
4
1
,
5
2
3
9
5
,
4
3
8
3
4
,
1
1
1
0
.
9
2
1
.
3
8
9
3
8
7
7
1
1
9
2
7
1
4
4
8
2
6
,
7
0
2
3
0
,
6
1
4
4
1
,
2
2
6
2
7
,
4
8
4
3
9
,
3
5
6
9
1
,
0
6
9
3
2
,
5
2
0
0
.
9
6
1
.
4
4
9
5
5
7
8
9
1
9
2
8
1
3
2
8
2
3
,
8
6
2
3
8
,
8
8
9
2
5
,
9
2
6
3
7
,
0
3
1
9
6
,
2
9
3
3
6
,
4
9
1
9
5
2
9
3
8
1
9
2
9
1
4
4
8
3
1
,
4
8
6
3
0
,
0
9
0
3
8
,
8
0
4
2
5
,
8
6
9
3
9
,
4
1
7
9
7
,
1
6
2
3
7
,
2
3
3
1
.
0
1
1
.
5
2
1
,
0
1
6
9
6
0
1
9
3
0
1
4
3
8
4
2
,
2
6
5
3
0
,
6
2
5
3
9
,
4
2
4
2
6
,
2
8
3
4
0
,
5
8
2
9
1
,
1
4
5
3
7
,
8
1
1
1
.
0
1
1
.
5
2
1
,
0
2
9
9
5
9
1
9
3
1
1
4
6
8
4
0
,
8
7
6
3
0
,
5
9
6
3
6
,
9
8
9
2
4
,
6
5
9
3
4
,
6
2
7
7
4
,
2
4
4
3
4
,
8
1
6
1
.
0
8
1
.
6
2
9
3
6
9
4
1
1
9
3
2
1
4
1
8
3
1
,
8
4
7
2
9
,
8
2
5
3
4
,
0
9
5
2
2
,
7
3
0
3
4
,
3
1
1
7
5
,
9
7
7
3
8
,
8
6
1
1
.
1
4
1
.
7
1
1
,
0
0
6
1
,
1
4
0
1
9
3
3
1
4
7
8
5
5
,
2
5
6
3
0
,
8
7
8
3
5
,
4
2
2
2
3
,
6
1
4
2
0
,
6
1
4
4
7
,
6
2
2
2
2
,
3
3
2
1
.
1
4
1
.
7
1
5
8
2
6
3
0
1
9
3
4
1
5
9
8
6
3
,
7
4
6
3
1
,
6
0
2
3
9
,
2
8
1
2
6
,
1
8
7
2
2
,
8
4
2
6
4
,
5
1
4
2
9
,
4
5
1
1
.
0
5
1
.
5
7
5
8
2
7
5
0
1
9
0
0
–
1
0
–
8
.
2
%
2
6
.
1
%
4
5
.
4
%
1
9
.
4
%
1
9
.
8
%
4
2
.
8
%
1
0
.
3
%
0
.
9
7
0
.
9
7
1
,
0
7
9
1
,
2
7
7
1
9
1
1
–
2
0
0
.
8
%
3
.
9
%
1
1
.
7
%
1
8
.
0
%
–
2
1
.
3
%
–
8
.
3
%
1
3
4
.
7
%
–
6
.
1
%
1
.
0
8
1
.
4
6
9
8
1
1
,
0
3
6
1
9
2
1
–
2
6
1
5
.
0
%
1
1
.
8
%
1
4
.
6
%
1
6
.
6
%
1
6
.
6
%
3
1
.
0
%
–
2
0
.
8
%
–
7
.
5
%
0
.
9
6
1
.
4
4
8
8
8
8
1
2
1
9
2
7
–
3
4
1
0
.
8
%
4
.
5
%
3
.
2
%
–
4
.
7
%
–
4
.
7
%
–
4
2
.
0
%
–
2
9
.
2
%
–
9
.
4
%
1
.
0
6
1
.
5
8
8
8
2
8
8
8
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
S
e
e
 
f
o
o
t
n
o
t
e
 
3
9
.
N
o
t
e
s
:
L
o
o
m
 
e
q
u
i
v
a
l
e
n
t
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
G
r
e
g
o
r
y
 
C
l
a
r
k
 
(
1
9
8
7
,
 
1
9
–
4
9
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
l
e
n
g
t
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
k
d
a
y
 
w
a
s
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
t
w
e
l
v
e
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
0
0
t
o
 
1
9
1
1
,
 
t
e
n
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
1
2
 
t
o
 
1
9
1
6
,
 
n
i
n
e
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
1
7
,
 
a
n
d
 
e
i
g
h
t
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
1
7
 
t
o
 
1
9
3
0
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
s
h
o
r
t
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
i
n
 
r
e
a
l
i
t
y
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
w
o
r
k
d
a
y
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
n
o
t
s
t
r
i
c
t
l
y
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
m
i
l
l
s
.
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
d
e
ﬂ
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
T
e
x
t
i
l
e
 
(
g
o
l
d
)
 
I
n
d
e
x
.“free national and international competition” was one of the main prin-
ciples behind the revolutionary industrial policy (Pani, 46).
Once Obregón came to power the free-trade spirit waned, and duties
were gradually increased. However, although speciﬁc tariﬀs for cloth were
higher between 1921 and 1926 than during the Porﬁriato, ad valorem tar-
iﬀs were not, since prices had also increased. Moreover, the eﬀective rate
of protection for cloth fell, because between the two periods, ad valorem
tariﬀs for raw cotton rose more than those for cloth.41
In the Workers’ and Industrialists’ Convention of 1925–27, the three
major actors in the political economy of the textile industry—business-
men, labor, and the government—chose an institutional arrangement that
oﬀered no incentives for technological transformation and therefore re-
quired high tariﬀs. Moreover, the depression that aﬀected the textile in-
dustry from 1926 onward also created incentives for increased protection
throughout the world. This explains the substantial increases in the tariﬀ
on cloth from 1927 to 1933, which made them several times higher than
those that prevailed during both the Porﬁriato and the early 1920s. This en-
abled most mills to survive, jobs to continue, and social order to endure.
However, the lack of technological innovation in an industry sheltered by
high rates of protection condemned Mexico’s textile industry to become in-
creasingly more outdated and unable to compete in world markets.
From 1933 to 1947, ad valorem tariﬀs decreased as a result of the in-
crease in cloth prices. However the depreciation of the peso from 2.6 pe-
sos per dollar in 1931 (when Mexico left the gold standard) to 5.5 in 1940
provided the industry with a further margin of protection. World War II
generated an exceptional situation, as the Mexican textile industry was
even capable of exporting vast quantities of cloth. When the war ended the
situation reversed, and the industry demanded a new increase in tariﬀs.
This came about at the end of 1947, when the new tariﬀ schedule was
changed to include both an ad valorem and a speciﬁc duty. Yet, since an
oﬃcial price list was established, and this list did not change for several
years, ad valorem tariﬀs gradually decreased from 1947 to 1955 as a result
of price increases. However, the peso continued depreciating, going from
4.8 pesos per dollar in 1947 to 8.6 in 1940, and then to 12.50 in 1954, pro-
viding further protection. Moreover, after 1947 the import of speciﬁc
items in the tariﬀ schedule were forbidden for some years (see tables 10.4
and 10.5).
The 1925–27 convention agreements may be understandable under the
circumstances of worldwide depression in the textile industry. Neverthe-
less, the precepts adopted there were ratiﬁed over and over again. In spite
of the eﬀorts made by industrialists in 1932 and 1935 to introduce a more
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41. Increased foreign competition must be part of the reason why CIVSA’s markup (price/
costs) decreased from 96 percent from 1904–1908 to 45 percent from 1923–27.ﬂexible wage schedule, the Textile Workers’ and Industrialists’ Convention
of 1937–1939 kept it unchanged.42
After World War II, when the old equipment was worn out and needed
to be replaced, industrialists made another attempt to change the restric-
tions imposed on the implementation of new technology. In 1945 CIVSA’s
president explained at the annual shareholders’ meeting that it was urgent
for Santa Rosa, as well as for Mexican textile industry as a whole, to fully
modernize its equipment in order to be able to produce intensely in “con-
ditions of eﬃcient competition.” “It is a matter of life and death for the na-
tional industry,” he argued, “but full modernization generates problems of
personnel, wage-lists, etc., that need to be solved uniformly and evenly.”43
According to him, CIVSA and other companies were only waiting for a fa-
vorable agreement by the Convention of Workers and Industrialists of
theTextile Industry to be held in that year, to carry out the project.44How-
ever, despite their eﬀorts, they had no success.45Only new plants established
after the war were exempt from restrictions imposed by the industrywide
labor contract, and some modern mills were established (IBRD, 69; CV,
AAG, February 28, 1928). Old mills had to replace their worn-out equip-
ment with used equipment. In 1956, for example, a considerable share of
the machinery imported was used (29.07 percent of the looms, 38.28 per-
cent of the spinning frames, and 52.98 percent of the carding machines).46
In 1950, CIVSA’s president explained that after several months of nego-
tiations, restrictions on the modernization of the industry had not been
lifted.47 That same year, a National Union of Industrialists for Textile
Modernization (Unión Nacional de Industriales para la Modernización Tex-
til), to which CIVSA belonged, was created to ﬁght for the liberalization
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42. Segunda Ponencia de la Compañia Industrial de Orizaba S.A. In Primera Convención
Mexicana de Empresarios Textiles (Rama del Algodón), April 9–12, 1945, 175.
43. CV, Actas de la Asamblea General (Minutes of the General Shareholders Meeting;
AAG), February 26, 1927.
44. Ibid.
45. An agreement was reached at the Convention of Workers and Industrialists of the Tex-
tile Industry held in May 1946, by which a special commission would undertake a study of the
necessary conditions for the modernization of the industry. However this commission did not
reach any conclusions and was dissolved. An Arbitration Organism contemplated in the
agreement of May 1946 was left in charge of the study but the labor sector members were op-
posed to participate in the project and it was also dissolved. The Minister of Industry and La-
bor asked the parties interested in the modernization of the industry to carry out private meet-
ings in order to propose solutions to the problem. As a result of these meetings an agreement
was reached on July 7, 1950, that generated “the General Regulation for the Modernization
of the Textile Industry,” to be included in the collective contract (Contrato Obligatorio). It was
approved by two-thirds of the labor force in the industry, but according to those ﬁrms that had
already started modernizing their machinery it only froze the modernization process. The
General Regulations for the Modernization of the Textile Industry was eﬀective as of January
25, 1951 (Diario Oﬁcial, October 23, 1950, February 6, 1951).
46. See Javier Barajas Manzano, Aspectos de la Industria Textil de Algodón en México
(Mexico City, 1959), 51.
47. CV, AAG, March 20, 1950.of the legal restrictions on the use of new technology. However, a minority
of industrialists, who were in favor of continuing to work with outdated
machinery, together with the unions were able to prevent any modiﬁcation
of the labor laws and wage-lists.48
Early in 1951, employers and workers ﬁnally agreed on the general rules
to be followed in the modernization of equipment, rationalization of work-
ing methods and wage scales, and specialization within the industry. Yet
this agreement was only “a preliminary outline of principles to be followed
by other agreements to implement speciﬁc programs.” According to the
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, although the
agreement was an important initial step, it was “not expected to have sig-
niﬁcant consequences for the time being” (IBRD, 69).
From 1951 onward the “General Rules for the Modernization of the
Textile Industry” were included as an addendum to the wage-list.49 These
rules allowed more ﬂexibility in the operation of modern machinery,50 and
set rules for the dismissal of excess workers. However, the minority of ﬁrms
that had already begun a modernization process, of which CIVSA and CI-
DOSA were part, were opposed to them, considering that the speciﬁc cri-
teria the new regulations established in terms of wages, severance fees, and
workloads imposed severe restrictions for the modernization of the indus-
try.51 The members of the National Union for the Modernization of the
Textile Industry considered it inadequate that those rules were voted for by
the whole industry rather than by only those mills that had begun mod-
ernizing their machinery since 1946. They argued that the interests of ﬁrms
operating with old machinery “that only seek for their indeﬁnite subsis-
tence”52 was opposed to modernization. Since outdated ﬁrms had the ma-
jority of votes in the Workers and Industrialists Congress, no set of regula-
tions that would eﬀectively promote modernization could come out from a
process that included the whole industry on a basis of one vote per mill.
Moreover, outdated ﬁrms had allied with labor in their hostility to mod-
ernization. Workers, traditionally reticent of modernization, were particu-
larly opposed to it, since most of them worked in antiquated mills.53 Al-
though these new laws permitted the creation of some modern mills and
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48. CV, AAG, March 21, 1951.
49. Diario Oﬁcial, February 6, 1951.
50. Modern machinery was deﬁned as that which reduced labor with respect to the ma-
chinery considered by the Workers and Industrialist Convention of 1937–1939. Diario Oﬁcial,
February 6, 1951, 9.
51. Diario Oﬁcial, October 23, 1950.
52. Diario Oﬁcial, October 23, 1950. Letter from several ﬁrms that were members of the
Unión de Industriales para la Modernización Textil to the president of the Comisión Mixta
Obrero-Patronal de Contrato Colectivo del Trabajo de la Industria Textil del Algodón y sus
Mixturas.
53. Ibid. Letter from several ﬁrms members of the “Unión Nacional de Industriales para la
Modernización Textil” to the president of the Convención Mixta Obrero-Patronal, del Con-
trato Colectivo de Trabajo de la Industria Textil del Algodón y sus Mixturas, 5.the modernization of certain departments of old mills, the restrictions it
imposed on the process, together with high rates of protection, generated
few investments for the modernization of the industry.
The result was that the textile industry became increasingly more out-
dated. Whereas in Mexico there had been no major changes in the indus-
try’s methods of production since 1912, in the United States the introduc-
tion of new technologies between 1910 and 1936 had already generated a
signiﬁcant reduction in labor requirements (see table 10.13).
At the 1945 Textile Convention CIDOSA presented a detailed compar-
ative analysis of productivity levels in the Mexican, American, and English
industries.54Its results showed the disastrous state of the Mexican industry
(see table 10.14). According to CIDOSA, the structure of the collective la-
bor contract for the industry was one of the main reasons. In addition to
the rigid wage-list, it forced the industry to keep the same number of work-
ers hired; any worker who left the mill for any reason had to be replaced.
Moreover, because it established a promotion system based on seniority, it
prevented ﬁrms from choosing and promoting personnel on the basis of
aptitude and eﬀort.55 England’s productivity levels had also lagged behind
those of the United States as a result of a ﬁxed collective labor contract that
determined the wages to be paid per unit of production and type of work,
the number of workers per machine, and their duties. Nevertheless, in En-
gland modernization was gradually phased in, allowing the industry to im-
plement certain technological changes (i.e., installing the warp-stop mo-
tion system in plain looms).56
A United Nations study on the productivity of the Latin American tex-
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Table 10.13 Reduction in the labor required to produce the same quantity of coarse
cloth in the United States, 1910–1936
Yarn preparation (Preparación de Hilados) 49.6%
Spinning (Tróciles) 26.9%
Spooling and drawing (Cañoneros y Repaso) 36.3%
Weaving (Telares) 52.8%
Cloth reception (Recepción de Manta) 14.2%
Source:Segunda Ponencia de la Compañía Industrial de Orizaba S.A. in Primera Convención
Mexicana de Empresarios Textiles (Rama del Algodón), April 9–12, 1945, 196.
54. Data for the Mexican industry were calculated by CIDOSA; data for the United States
and England CIDOSA were obtained from a formal report by the English Textile Commis-
sion on a visit to the United States in March–April 1944.
55. See Segunda Ponencia de la Compañía Industrial de Orizaba S.A., 195.
56. Ibid., 188 and 197. “In 1892, at the peak of prosperity in the weaving industry, a Uni-
form List covering all the weaving districts was adopted on terms very favorable to wages. In
late 1932 the Uniform List was modiﬁed to accommodate the ‘more-looms’ system; but in
1935 it was altered again, this time to discourage the practice of giving weavers more than four
powerlooms to tend. To ensure that all employers would adhere to the 1935 list, it was given
the force of law by Act of Parliament” (Lazonick, Competitive Advantage, 56).tile industry, published in 1951, indicated that as many as 85 percent of the
spindles and 95 percent of the looms working in Mexico were out of date;
that is, built during the ﬁrst quarter of the century or earlier (Naciones
Unidas, 87). Likewise, a Mexican public ﬁnancial study (Naﬁnsa) reported
that in 1957, 34.4 percent of the spindles, 46 percent of the carding ma-
chines, and 33 percent of the looms operating that year had been built be-
fore 1910. Technological backwardness was worst in states such as Ver-
acruz, where labor regulations were more strictly implemented because of
their stronger labor movements,57 and where the mills were older. In this
state, 67 percent of the spindles, 72 percent of the carding machines, and
73 percent of the looms working in 1957 had been manufactured before
1910 (Barajas, 1959, 67–74, 97–99). The industry gradually moved away
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Table 10.14 Productivity comparisons, c. 1945
Mexico vs. Mexico vs. 
U.S. England Mexico U.S. (%) England
Spinning
Warp No. 9a
Kilograms per worker per hour 10.45 7.22 2.61 25 36
Total labor 226 327 904 400 276
Warp No. 31, Filling No. 43b
Kilograms per worker per hour 4.45 2.32 1.13 25 49
Total labor 101 195 399 395 205
Weaving
Coarse unbleached clothc
Meters per worker per hour 32.4 12.8 9.8 30 77
Total labor 890 2,252 2,941 330 131
Medium quality unbleached clothd
Meters per worker per hour 44.5 14 9.4 21 67
Total labor 337 1,072 1,599 474 149
Source:Segunda Ponencia de la Compañía Industrial de Orizaba S.A. in Primera Convención Mexicana
de Empresarios Textiles (Rama del Algodón), April 9–12, 1945, 175–90. Data for spinning and weaving
are the sum of the diﬀerent parts of both processes, including yarn preparation and cloth preparation
and reception.
aSpinning mills that manufactured 13,605 kilos of No. 9 warp yarn in 48 hours.
bSpinning mills that manufactured 13,605 kilos of warp yarn No. 31, plus 8,154 kilos of No. 43 weft (ﬁll-
ing) yarn in 48 hours.
cWeaving mills that produced 1,385,316 meters of coarse unbleached cloth in 48 hours.
dWeaving mills that produced 720,540 meters of medium quality, unbleached cloth in 48 hours.
57. Legal wages and regulations were only important where the labor movement was strong
enough to enforce them. In 1959 Javier Barajas Manzano explained that wages established by
the wage-schedule (contrato colectivo de trabajo) could not be taken as the wages workers were
actually paid. “It is well known,” he explained, “that this document is not complied with by
most mills, especially by those established at the beginning of the century, but that wages are
set through bilateral agreements between workers and employers” (Barajas, 28).from those states where the labor movement was strongest, wages highest,
and labor regulations most eﬀective. In 1923, 20.8 percent of spindles and
22.37 percent of looms in Mexico were in Veracruz, but by 1950 these ﬁg-
ures had declined to 14.81 percent and 17.81 percent, respectively.58 In the
end, the strength of Veracruz’ labor movement was the cause of its own de-
mise.59
According to the United Nations study, the number of man-hours-per-
kilogram of production was 269 percent higher in the Mexican cotton textile
industry than in a standard modern industry. Modernization of equipment
could increase productivity by 260 percent in spinning and 281 percent in
weaving. Yet this would have caused the displacement of more than 15,000
workers and would have required an investment of over one hundred mil-
lion 1950 dollars (Naciones Unidas 1951, 87). In contrast, according to the
Naﬁnsa study, the modernization of the industry was feasible, since its cal-
culations indicated that in 1958 it would have required 103,394,800 pesos,
which represented only 0.67 percent of the annual aggregate investment
made in Mexico in 1957. If the process had taken place over ten years, it
would have generated an annual displacement of 896.53 workers, who could
have been relocated to other sectors (Barajas 1959, 149).
The consistent opposition of textile trade unions to the introduction of
labor-saving methods and machinery was mirrored by the wage-list im-
posed by the labor law (contrato-ley), which rigidly limited the possibilities
of modernizing and rationalizing the industry (IBRD, 69; Naciones Uní-
das, 87). Yet it is diﬃcult to assess whether the unions’ policy of keeping the
wage-schedule unchanged responded to the wishes of their rank and ﬁle.
Lack of investment in the textile industry generated a decline in the real
wages of cotton textile workers that was greater than the reduction experi-
enced by workers in other manufacturing sectors. Whereas between 1939
and 1954 real wages in the Mexican manufacturing industry as a whole de-
clined by 11 percent, wages in the cotton textile industry fell by 38 percent
(Barajas, 31). Moreover, wages paid by old mills were far lower than those
established by law for modern ones. The 1955 wage-list (contrato ley) es-
tablished, for example, a daily wage of $12.70 for a card tender working in
an old mill, but $26.02 for one working in a plant with modern equipment
(Barajas, 33).
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58. Ibid., 44.
59. This result is similar to that of Przeworski’s model of accumulation and legitimation,
when the economic militancy of organized wage earners (r in the model) is high. Capitalists
stop investing and wages cannot be maintained at the high level. However, the situation of
theMexican textile industry is more complex. Given that ris diﬀerent in diﬀerent regions, this
lowers the level of r, which in the long run reduces wages in a region with a relative higher r,
also shortening the length of time within which wages will decrease. An increase in tariﬀs does
the opposite, allowing for a greater increase in r without lowering wages, and extending the
time before this takes place. I am currently working to expand Przeworski’s model in this di-
rection. See Przeworski 1985, 148–59, 179–96.The government’s protectionist policy placed incentives to maintain the
status quo indeﬁnitely. “Since the high protective tariﬀhas made it possible
to operate proﬁtably in spite of technical ineﬃciency, management and
labor have become complacent about the prevailing state of aﬀairs in the
industry” (International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 69).
However, modernization of the industry could not be postponed forever,
and as time went by and the industry became more outdated, the problem
became increasingly diﬃcult to solve.
Mexico was not alone in this diﬃcult quandary. In Brazil and in Ecuador
the textile industries in 1951 were in a similar or worse situation, facing re-
strictions on the adoption of new technology caused by a rigid organiza-
tion of labor comparable to that in Mexico.60 Because nothing like the
Mexican Revolution had happened in these countries, we should be care-
ful about the extent to which we attribute the growth of labor organization
in Mexico and its consequences for industrial development to the Revo-
lution.
10.6 Conclusions
As we have seen, CIVSA’s international competitiveness and productiv-
ity levels during the Porﬁriato, although modest, did not improve for most
of the rest of the century, until the late 1980s, when the Mexican economy
was opened up to world markets and most textile mills went bankrupt. In
1911, CIVSA’s costs and technology were not so diﬀerent from those
prevalent in England, or the United States, although closer to the former
than to the latter. This conclusion can be generalized to the Mexican cot-
ton textile industry as a whole. As time went by, the gap between Mexican
costs and productivity levels and those that prevailed in cloth-exporting
countries increased.
Why did this happen? Whom should we blame? The deterioration of rel-
ative productivity and competitiveness that the Mexican industry suﬀered
does not appear to have been caused by the action of either the unions, in-
dustrialists, or government alone.
What took place was a complex interaction in which unions, industrial-
ists, and government found themselves better oﬀ in the short run by main-
taining—unchanged—the technology employed by the industry. Unem-
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60. It is interesting to note that in São Paulo, these restrictions were less important than in
Rio de Janeiro. The United Nations report indicated that the excess of personnel in Brazil’s
old mills was not due to the incapacity of managers to recognize it, but by the perpetuation
of a traditional organization of labor dating from the end of the nineteenth century or the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, when most of the mills were founded. Because the textile in-
dustry developed later in São Paulo in Rio de Janeiro, restrictions on the organization of la-
bor were less important. In Chile and Peru, where the textile industry developed after the
1930s, there was less excess labor and fewer institutional restrictions on reducing it (Naciones
Unidas 1951, 1–17, 20, 55, 74, 112).ployment, widespread bankruptcies, and social unrest were the alternatives.
Yet every time the decision to change the textile labor contract and to start
modernization was postponed, the problem for the future worsened. If, at
a given moment, the status quo was maintained for fear of unemployment
and of mills’ bankruptcies, as the gap between the technology used by the
Mexican industry and that in the industry’s leaders elsewhere in the world
widened, the danger of widespread unemployment and bankruptcies in the
industry only increased. In the late 1980s, when the decision to modernize
the industry and open up the economy was ﬁnally taken, the industry was
hard hit.61
Thus the agreements reached in 1925–27, explainable on the verge of the
Great Depression, were maintained without any changes until at least
1951, and with few modiﬁcations until 1972.62For those workers employed
at textile mills, this was perhaps not a bad choice, as long as they trained
their children to be something other than textile workers. Although in-
dustrialists faced important constraints on modernizing equipment, they
could reap large enough proﬁts from the mills to keep them operating
without making any major investment in them; they could also diversify
their interests into other sectors. The government could maintain a rela-
tively peaceful and long-lasting regime for several decades without much
trouble. Yet the country as a whole was not able to grow at the rates that a
buoyant, exporting industry could have allowed, and for decades most
Mexicans were forced to dress in expensive, poor-quality cloth.
The analysis of productivity levels in Mexican textile mills indicates that
the relative power of workers to control the relation between eﬀort and pay
is a crucial factor in determining the technology employed and therefore lev-
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61. Whereas manufacturing production increased by an annual rate of 4.60 percent be-
tween 1986 and 1990, textile industry production rose only by 0.97 percent. This hides the
even worse performance of the weaving and spinning sector of the industry, which did worse
than other subsectors in the textile industry. Its production in terms of real pesos declined by
13 percent from 1980 to 1991, and its employment by 8 percent. In 1998, only a third of tex-
tile mills in Mexico were considered capable of producing at the level of quality, volume, and
prices required by the U.S. market. Sandra Martinez (1994, appendix, table 12). Gary Gerreﬃ
and Jennifer Bair, “En Búsqueda del Desarrolo Integrado en México,” in Trabajo, 1 (2) De-
cember 1998, 160; Márquez (1994, 98–100).
62. December 31, 1972, was the due date to implement a new operating system based on
workloads (Diario Oﬁcial,September 15, 1980, 15, chapter 6, article 45. The wage-list of 1966
was the ﬁrst to allow that plain loom weavers tended more than four looms, on the condition
that the union agreed to it and that the weaver was paid 45 percent of the wages set for the
normal load on the extra quantities produced with the additional machinery (Diaro Oﬁcial,
December 24, 1966, chapter 6, article 45b, 7 and paragraph 190, 55). In the National Conven-
tion of the Textile Industry, held in October 1987, industrialists continued to complain about
the wage-lists (Contrato-Ley), claiming that there was always a lag between the technology
they contemplated and the state of the art technology necessary to compete internationally,
and that it was erroneous to set a general contract for all the industry when it was very het-
erogeneous (Martínez 1994, 117–26). By 1994 the industrywide collective contract (Contrato-
Ley) of the textile industry had recently been suppressed (Márquez 1994, 123).els of competitiveness and productivity, as Lazonick has pointed out.63In ac-
cordance with the Wolcott and Clark ﬁndings for the case of India, it is clear
that in Mexico the poor performance of the textile industry, particularly af-
ter the Revolution, was a problem of “the low labor input per mill worker”
(Wolcott and Clark, 421). Yet it is also evident that this did not result from a
“low taste for eﬀort on the job,” or from managerial incompetence, but from
a more complex situation, caused in part by the power exercised by workers
in the labor market to block manpower reductions for fear of unemploy-
ment. However, it was also determined by the power exerted by the owners
of smaller mills, who were either unwilling or unable to make new invest-
ments and were fearful of going bankrupt. The power of these two actors,
however, would probably have not been enough to shape the evolution of the
industry without the support of a government that valued social and politi-
cal stability above economic development, and therefore pursued the tariﬀ
and labor policies that maintenance of the status quo required.
This study suggests that structures of social power are important vari-
ables in explaining the various development paths taken by countries (or
regions). The institutions that govern the social relations of production are
not, however, determined solely by unions, employers, or the government,
but by the interaction between them, in arrangements that are greatly in-
ﬂuenced by path dependency, and therefore diﬃcult to change.
This study also indicates that the protectionist policy for the Mexican tex-
tile industry carried out from the late 1920s on was not the result of an im-
port substituting strategy. Protection was not meant to foster the creation
of a nonexistent domestic industry. Rather, it was put into place to allow the
subsistence of an industry that was forced by labor regulations to exist in
technological and organizational terms as a frozen picture of the 1900s.
Moreover, high levels of protection were not the result of a dependentistide-
ology, but the consequence of a self-perpetuating situation in which all de-
ciding actors were better oﬀ in the short run by promoting such a policy.
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